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Summary :
The rate of return constraint is an Important aspect of the Averch-Johnson
theoretical formulation and it is also an important variable in the actual
regulatory process used in public utility rate making. However, the lack of
independence between the regulatory constraint and the method of establishing the
rate base, which actually exists in practice, has been ignored in the original
A-J analysis as well as subsequent studies. This study shows that failure to
incorporate these important dimensions into the A-J theory raises serious questions
concerning the validity of both the basic theory and the large number of studies
which have followed this seminal work.

THE RATE OF RETURN, RATE BASE METHODS, AND THE REGULATORY CONSTRAINT
by
Walter J. Primeaux, Jr. and Randy A. Nelson
INTRODUCTION
The article published by H. Averch and L. Johnson in 1962 constitutes
seminal work in every sense. Not only did they theoretically formulate
important aspects of the behavior of regulated firms but they stimulated
a very large number of theoretical and empirical studies which attempted
either to introduce refinements to the theory or to assess its validity.
During the fifteen years since its formulation, however, the basic
theory, the subsequent theoretical refinements, and the empirical work
have ignored an important aspect of the behavior of regulatory commis-
sioners as they regulate public utility firms.
The rate of return constraint is an important aspect of the Averch-
Johnson theoretical formulation and it is also an important variable in
the actual regulatory process used in public utility rate making. How-
ever, the lack of independence between the regulatory constraint and the
method of establishing the rate base, which actually exists in practice,
has been ignored in the previous analyses. This study shows that failure
to incorporate these important dimensions into the Averch-Johnson theory
raises serious questions concerning the validity of both the basic theory
and the large number of studies which have followed this seminal work.
PREVIOUS STUDIES
Rate of return regulation, according to Averch-Johnson (1962), en-
courages a firm to use more capital than it should because of the larger
profits which the firm will earn from such behavior. The explanation of
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this behavior is rather straightforward. When firms are regulated by
regulatory commissions, they face profit constraints. "If the rate of
return, computed as the ratio of net revenue to the value of plant and
equipment (the rate base), is judged to be excessive, pressure is brought
to bear on the firm to reduce prices. If the rate is considered to be
too low, the firm is permitted to increase prices." Averch-Johnson (1962,
p. 1052).
The allowed rate of return, s, is permitted to exceed the market
cost of capital, r, by some specified percentage, v. Thus, s = r + v.
As all firms do, the regulated firm will attempt to maximize profits
by choosing the combination of inputs which will minimize production
costs. One difference with the regulated firm, however, is that its
perceptions of the cost of capital are different, since it is subjected
to rate of return regulation. The regulated firm does not perceive its
cost of capital to be r because it "reduces" the cost of capital by the
amount it earns from investing that capital. Consider a regulated firm
facing capital costs of, say, eight percent; if it is allowed to earn a
ten percent rate of return, the firm earns a net two percent. The firm,
therefore, would behave for investment purposes as if it3 cost of capital
were not ten percent, but six percent (r- v) = 8-2 = 6. It is this be-
havior which causes the misal location of capital 3nd labor. "...
private cost is less than market cost by an amount equal to this differ-
ence." Averch-Johnson (1962, p. 1053).
As Averch-Johnaon (1962, p. 1053) explain, this effect of regulation
is analogous to changing the relative prices of capital and labor. This
can be seen from Figure 1. If the output level is Qt , costs for the
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FIGURE 1
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regulated firm would be minimized at point A on the production isoquant
r—
v
where the isocost curve is . The unregulated firm, however, would
w
minimize costs on the same isoquant at point B, where the isocost curve
is — . It is very clear, according to Averch-Johnson, that regulate.]
w
firms use excessive capital intensive production methods.
As indicated earlier, there has been abundant additions to the eco-
nomic literature constituting theoretical refinements and empirical tests
of the Averch-Johnson thesis. Important theoretical refinements were
presented by Klevorick (1966), Kahn (1968), Kafoglis (1969), Takayama
(1969), Bailey and Malone (1970), Zajac (1970), Bauraol and Klevorick
(1970), Klevorick (1971), Stein and Borts (1972), Klevorick (1973),
McNicol (1973), and Needy (1975).
Empirical tests of the Averch-Johnson thesis were presented by Boyes
(1976), Courville (1974), Spann (1974), and Petersen (1975) and criti-
cisms of the last three studies were presented by McKay (1976).
There have also been many other examinations of the theory; however,
only three studies, discussed below, are of particular interest to this
paper.
Bsumol and Klevorick (1970, pp. 162-163) present a review of the
substance of the literature stemming from the Averch-Johnson model and
examine a number of propositions of the theory. One important conclusion
of this study is "It is at least plausible that other potential sources
of difficulty in the regulatory process dwarf the consequences of the
distortion in the capital -labor ratio that the model predicts." This
analysis is useful and interesting, and the authors are concerned about
regulatory matters. However, they do not consider the dependence
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incentive to have its property stated at a value higher
than its coat. The problem has given rise to a great
deal of controversy about proper valuation, especially
concerning original versus reproduction cost, and de-
preciation policy. In the present study the problem of
rate-base inflation is not viewed as one of valuation
but rather as one of acquisition—quite apart from the
problem of placing a valuation upon the rate base, the
firm has an incentive to acquire additional capital if
the allowable rate of return exceeds the cost of capital.
Averch-Johnson (1962, p. 1059).
The above quote clearly confirms the comment mentioned earlier con-
cerning the lack of attention to rate base methods and the accompanying
distortions caused by regulation in the original formulation by Averch-
Johnson. As mentioned earlier, these effects were also ignored by all
of the many authors who have followed up on this seminal research. This
section shows that overlooking these aspects of the regulatory process
may have affected the empirical research which has been done in a signifi-
cant way.
The regulatory process for utility firms is rather straightforward.
Rates of return are generally determined by the cost of capital. The
regulatory process specifics relevant costs and expenses which may be
recovered by the utility firm as services are priced to buyers. The
revenue requirement, that is the revenue that the utility is authorized
to collect, may be defined as follows, following Garfield and Lovejoy
(1964, p. 44).
(1) Revenue Requirement = cost of service
(2) RR = E + d + T 4 (V-D)R
where: RR = Revenue requirement.
E = Operating expenses,
d = Depreciation expenses.
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T = Taxes.
V = Gross valuation of the property serving the
public.
D Accrued depreciation.
R = Rate of return (a percentage).
(V-D) * Rate base (net valuation).
(V-D)R Return amount, or earnings allowed on the rate
base.
For our purposes, R, (V-D), and (V-D)R are the key variables in the regu-
latory process. The rate of return, R, is an amount determined by the
regulatory commission, based on its judgment of the cost of capital, and
the amount that the utility firm should be permitted to earn. D is the
accumulated depreciation which has accrued through time on the property
owned by the utility firm. V is the gross valuation of the property
serving the public. The term (V-D) is the rata base of the utility firm
and when the rate of return is applied to this amount, the return amount,
or earnings allowed to the utility firm are determined.
It is essential to understand that both the rate base (V-D) and the
rate of return (R) are variables. That is, both are part of the regulatory
process; their values are affected in a very important way by the regula-
tory regime a firm faces in the state in which it operates. Regulation
is not a homogeneous process across states; one important difference is
the method of rate base determination used by the regulatory commissions.
Since the regulatory powers are concerned with the level of earnings
generated by the firm, it is reasonable that considerable attention should
be directed to the method of rate base determination as well as the
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al lowed rate of return. The rate base is at the heart of the rate making
process. Indeed, it has developed through time that, depending upon the
state in which a utility firm operates, its rate base is generally deter-
mined by one of three basic methods; original cost, fair value, and repro-
duction costs. State statutes prescribe which of the three methods will
be used in a given state.
Original cost refers to a method where the utility property is valued
at a value equal to that when the property was first employed in a public
utility application. Reproduction cost valuation considers the appropriate
value to be what it would cost to install the same equipment today. This
value will exceed original cost if there has been inflation since the
time of installation. Fair value is effectively an average of original
and reproduction cost.
The significance of the above discussion is that three essentially
different procedures are used for computing the rate base and they yield
significantly different values. Original cost valuation methods gener-
ally yield the lowest valuation, while reproduction cost generally yield
the highest, and fair value yields a value in between.
It is generaly considered, therefore, that original cost represents
a less liberal method of rate base determination than either fair value
or reproduction cost. Reproduction cost represents the most liberal of
the three methods.. Note that these assessments of liberality refer to
(V-D), the size of the rate base alone, assuming an equal rate of return,
R, to a rate base, once its value has been determined. Empirical evi-
dence does not necessarily support that inference.
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Primeaux (1978) reported using standardized rate bases, eliminating
interstate differences concerning what should be included in the rate
base, and found no difference in realized rates of return between firms
controlled by original cost, fair value, and reproduction cost regulatory
regimes. One explanation presented for this result is that regulators
tend to adjust the rate of return downward when the rate base method is
upward bias. Eiteman (1962, p. 39) supports this conclusion in his
empirical study:
. . . commissions which regulate on original cost, a com-
paratively low valuation during the last decade, permit,
on the average, relatively higher percentage rates of re-
turn. Conversely, commissions which regulate on higher
fair-value or reproduction-cost rate bases offset the
effect of the higher rate base by granting, on the aver-
age, somewhat lower rates of return. These differences
in the mean rate of return allowed can be interpreted
as evidence that, although rate of return is supposedly
determined autonomously, its magnitude is in fact in-
fluenced by the type of rate base adopted.
It is this interdependence of the rate of return and the rate base method
which is at the heart of this analysis. Since rate of return is a key
element in the Averch-Johnson hypothesis it is obvious that the rate base
method must also be considered in that analysis.
THE IMPACT OF RATE BASE METHOD ON THE A-J EFFECT
The Effect of Different Rates of
Return for Differ ent Rate Bases—Partial Effect
To assess the impact of rate base methods on the Averch-Johnson ef-
fect consider three identical firms. Everything about the firms and their
external environment is identical except that one operates in a state
regulated by original cost rate base methods, one operates in a state
with fair-value rate base methods, and the third operates in a reproduction
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C03L jurisdiction. According to Averch-Johnson, each firm would be af-
fected in the s^me way and their decision to move toward a more capital
intensive process would be reflected in a diagram such as in Figure 1.
The isocost-curve and isoquants would be identical for each firm, even
though rate ba9e methods are different.
Following the earlier analysis, 6, is the allowed rate of return,
the market cost of capital is r, and v is the specified percentage by
which s is permitted to exceed the cost of capital; thus, s = r + v. From
Eiteman (1962) and Primeaux (1978) one observes that the allowed rate of
return is highest in original cost jurisdictions, lowest in reproduction
cost jurisdictions, and fair value jurisdictions allowed rates of return
in between these extremes.
The impact of the above differences in rates of return is clearly
reflected in the decision process involved in the A-J model. This is seen
in Figure 2. Points A and B are identical to those in Figure 1 and the
isoquant, Qt, and the isocost-curves, B. and B are also identical. In
addition to the basic diagram presented for Figure 1, Figure 2 presents
an important modification. For this analysis, assume that this firm is
regulated by a fair value regulatory procedure while the basic diagram in
Figure 1, carried forward to Figure 2 represents an original cost situa-
tion. The allowed rate of return, as was mentioned earlier, would be
iower (according to Eiteman and Primeaux) for the fair value firm than
in the original cost case. This means that for a fair value situation,
at a given cost of capital, the specified percentage by which the allowed
rate of return, (s), exceeds the cost of capital, (r), is lower than in
the original cost case. Thai is in the expression s = r + v, both s and
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FIGURE 2
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v decrease in the fair value case. When this happens, the lsocofit-curve,
B- is tangent at B_ instead of at B„ and the firm employes more capital
i * J i.
than at point B (where rate of return regulation does not exist) but less
than in the original cost rate making process.
The allowed rate of return for reproduction cost would be the low-
est of the three methods. The isocost-curves in this case would become
even flatter than B~ and the firm would use even less capital than in
the fair value and original cost cases, but more than in the case where
rate of return regulation does not exist. The above discussion is based
upon the assumption that the value of the capital stock is the same in
each rate base method and this is not the case; indeed, different values
for the same physical plants are characteristic of differences In rate
base methods. Consequently, the complete analysis must also consider
differences in the size of the rate base as well as the accompanying
adjustments to the rate of return; this analysis is presented in the
following section.
The Effect of Different Rates o f Return
and Different Sized Rate Bases— Total Effect
The relationship discussed thus far may be illustrated within the
framework of the original A-J model. The firm is assumed to produce
one output, employing two inputs, both of which are available at a con-
stant cost regardless of the quantities purchased. The firm is assumed
to maximize profits subject to a rate of return constraint imposed upon
It by the regulatory authorities.
Let: tt total profit of the firm
Y = the quantity of the firm' 3 output
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K the quantity of the capital input
L the quantity of the labor input
w the wage rate
r = the unit cost of capital
Y F(K,L) - the production function
F
K>
F
L * °' "W FLL < °» FKL' FLK > °
P « P(Y) * the inverse demand function
The rate of return constraint may be expressed as
1) P(Y)Y - wL - s(g)gK, where
g the rate base multiplier
s(g) the maximum allowed rate of return
s'(g) <
As discussed above, in determining the firm's allowed profit level
the regulatory authorities must decide how to value the firm's rate base,
or capital stock. The rate base multiplier, g, is the factor by which
the regulatory authorities adjust the firm's rate base to reflect an
original cost, fair value, or reproduction cost valuation. The firm's
maximum allowed rate of return, s, is assumed here to be a function of
the rate base valuation procedure, or the value of g. As mentioned earlier,
jurisdictions employing either fair value or reproduction cost methods of
valuation of the rate base are assumed to adjust the firm's allowed rate
of return downward to compensate for the higher value placed on the
capital stock compared with those in original cost jurisdictions. The
model thus accommodates the effect of the actual institutional procedures
and adjustments employed by regulatory commissions which were discussed
previously.
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The firm is assumed to maximize profits subject to (1). This yields
the following lagrangian and the necessary first-order conditions for a
maximum.
2) Z = PY - rK - wL - A (FY - wL - s(g)gK) .
3a) (1 - A) MRF
2
= (1 - X)w
3b) (1 ~ A) MRF
R
- r - -As(g)g
Adding Ar to each side and dividing by (1 - A) yields:
3b') MRF
R
«~ (r - s(g)g) + r
3c) PY - wL - s(g)gK -
To explore the effect of a change in g upon the firm's equilibrium
quantity of capital totally differentiate (3c) and simplify to obtain
M dk = (s'(g)g + s(g))K
dg (MRF
R
- s(g)g)
subtract s(g)g from both sides of (3b') and multiply through by (1-A).
Substitute this expression into the denominator of (4) to obtain
5) i£ . (1 - A)K (s'(g)g + s(g))dg r - s(g)g
Tills may be written as
,s dk (l-A )K
r , w , 1%16) di = tV6)T [»<«> (1 "E)]
where E =
—rr-^— " the elasticity of the rate base multiplier with
s'(g)g '
respect to the rate of return
Therefore
7) £ go- |l| Si
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Expression (7) clearly indicates the effect of a change in the rate
base valuation procedure upon the firm's equilibrium stock of capital.
If the rate base multiplier is; increased by a given percentage without
a corresponding downward adjustment of the allowed rate of return the
firm will choose to employ more capital. The opposite result holds when
the percentage change in the rate base multiplier is met with a more
than offsetting change in the allowed rate of return. Only when the per-
centage change in the rate base multiplier and the allowed rate of re-
turn are equal and offsetting will the firm have no incentive to adjust
its equilibrium stock of capital. Consequently, the use of the variable
s, the allowed rate of return, to serve as a proxy for the degree of
regulatory "tightness" is not justified. The rate of return constraint
may be loosened by increasing the rate base multiplier, while holding
the allowed rate of return constant. This result has serious implica-
tions for many of the previous studies of the A-J effect that have
relied upon the allowed rate of return for a measure of regulatory
tightness.
-
CONCLUSIONS
In the history of public utility economics, few theories have at-
tracted so much attention and generated so much research as the seminal
piece by Averch-Johnson. Although their theoretical work has been
followed by a large quantity of theoretical and empirical analyses, that
work has neglected the important interaction between the rate of return
and the method of rate base determination. This analysis has shown that the
interaction between the rate base method and the rate of return cannot
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be ignored in the Averch-Johnson theory. Indeed, previous empirical
studies suggest that the rate of return is not independent of the method
of rate base determination; and this fact suggests important, implications
for the Averch-Johnson theory.
This analysis does not show that the Averch-Johnson theory is not
valid. It does show however, that a very important dimension must be
added to the analysis. Moreover, the omission of that important element
raises serious questions concerning the validity of some of the empirical
studies which have followed the landmark work by Averch-Johnson.
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F00TN0TE5
1. This- point is made: in a number of previous studies including
Garfield and Lovejoy (1964), Primeaux (1978), Phillips (1969).
2. MRF. = the marginal revenue product of the ith factor.
3. Bauinol and Klevorick (1970) have shown < A < 1, so (1-A)
K > 0. s(g)g, the allowed rate of return, must be greater than r,
the cost of capital, so (r-s(g)g) < 0.
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